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 Imprecision as an Account of the Preference
Reversal Phenomenon
By DAVID J. BUTLER AND GRAHAM C. LOOMES*
Many individuals’ choices and valuations involve a degree of uncertainty/impreci-
sion. This paper reports an experiment designed to obtain some measure of
imprecision and to examine the extent to which it can explain preference reversals
of two opposite forms, one of which appears not to have been reported previously.
The model of imprecision we examine not only predicts both patterns but also
provides an account of earlier results that are otherwise not well explained. The
results suggest that any successful descriptive theory of choice and valuation will
need to allow in some way for the imprecision surrounding people’s decisions. (JEL
C91, D11, D81)
The preference reversal “phenomenon” oc-
curs if individuals reverse their stated prefer-
ence orderings over two goods in a predictable
manner when different procedures are used to
elicit them, even though the different elicitation
procedures are formally equivalent and incen-
tive compatible.
The large number of papers discussing this
phenomenon (for a review, see Christian Seidl
2002) show that it is easy to produce, but much
harder to explain. Yet ﬁnding an explanation is
an issue of both theoretical and practical signif-
icance. This phenomenon is not just an experi-
mental curiosity with little relevance outside the
laboratory. There are many important areas of
the political economy—including health, safety,
and the environment—where policy decisions
may be strongly inﬂuenced by “stated prefer-
ence” measures of value elicited from the
public.
1 If different ways of eliciting those pref-
erences can produce substantially different re-
sults, which may have radically different
implications for resource allocation and public
welfare, it is important to understand the pro-
cesses people are using to generate their re-
sponses. In the absence of such an understanding,
it is difﬁcult—and potentially dangerous—to
make judgments about the appropriate elicitation
method(s) to use or about the degree of conﬁdence
we can have in the measures they produce.
This paper tries to move us a step closer to
such an understanding. In what follows, we
describe a novel elicitation instrument used to
explore the ways in which a model of reason-
able but imprecise preferences might give rise
to various patterns of preference reversal. That
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277model also organizes data that earlier research-
ers were unable to explain satisfactorily.
I. Background and Conceptual Framework
The idea that people’s judgments and prefer-
ences may to some degree be imprecise and
“noisy” is not new (see, for example, Gustav
Fechner 1860, 1966), and in the 1950s and
1960s there was considerable interest in models
of probabilistic choice and random preferences
(e.g., Frederick Mosteller and Philip Nogee
1951; Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 1958; Dun-
can Luce 1959; Gordon Becker, Morris De
Groot, and Jacob Marschak 1963; Luce and
Patrick Suppes 1965). It was known then—and
there has been a considerable accumulation of
supporting evidence since—that when pre-
sented with exactly the same decision on two
separate occasions, an individual’s response
might differ from one occasion to the other. So
not all of an individual’s observed responses
could be consistent with a single stable utility
function.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century,
however, those interested in explaining various
robust and frequently replicated departures
from expected utility theory (EUT) did not look
to noise or random error for an answer. Instead,
the main focus was upon developing alternative
deterministic models of individual choice, most
of which relaxed one or more of the axioms of
EUT in ways that might accommodate the
“violations.”
It was not until the mid-1990s that the issue
of the stochastic component of decision behav-
ior began once again to receive serious attention
(see, for example, Barry Sopher and Gary
Gigliotti 1993; David Harless and Colin Cam-
erer 1994; John Hey and Chris Orme 1994;
Loomes and Robert Sugden 1995, 1998). Al-
though those papers formulated the stochastic
speciﬁcation in somewhat different ways, they
shared what might be regarded as the standard
economists’ “top-down” approach: that is, they
took some highly articulated deterministic the-
ory to be at the “core” of people’s preferences
and then proposed some method of adding ran-
domness and/or error to that core. By so doing,
it was possible to show that certain patterns of
behavior that might appear to be systematic
violations of a certain core theory could in fact
be consistent with that same core theory plus a
particular model of the stochastic term. It re-
mained the case, however, that no single com-
bination of deterministic core and particular
stochastic speciﬁcation could accommodate
more than a subset of the best-known “regular-
ities” observed in decision experiments.
2
By contrast with those “top-down” models,
our focus in this paper will be upon a more
“bottom-up” approach. We take as our starting
point individuals who are typical of those who
participate in experiments and surveys: that is,
those who are somewhat uncertain and impre-
cise about their preferences in the face of the
kinds of tasks they are presented with in deci-
sion experiments or stated preference surveys.
We then take a model of imprecise preferences
which Kenneth MacCrimmon and Maxwell
Smith (1986) proposed as an account for pref-
erence reversals and we implement an experi-
ment designed to explore and develop that
model.
MacCrimmon and Smith—henceforth M&S—
considered two forms of preference reversal: in
money and in probability. The ﬁrst of these is
the best-known and most frequently studied for-
mat for a preference reversal experiment, and
operates as follows. Respondents are presented
with two binary lotteries. One offers a relatively
large chance of a modest sum of money and a
residual chance of zero; the other offers a rather
smaller chance of a considerably bigger prize
and a larger chance of zero.
3 After Sarah Lich-
tenstein and Paul Slovic (1971), these have
come to be known respectively as the P-bet and
the $-bet. Respondents are then asked to under-
take three tasks (not necessarily in this order): to
place a “certainty equivalent” money value on
the P-bet; to place a certainty equivalent money
value on the $-bet; and to make a straight choice
between the two bets.
2 For a review of the main permutations of “core 
error” models, and the extent to which different “regulari-
ties” can or cannot be accommodated by them, see Loomes
(2005). For an example of a speciﬁc attempt to apply one
such model to preference reversals, see Ulrich Schmidt and
John Hey (2004), who found that even when both pricing
and choice errors of a particular kind were excluded, a
systematic deviation from standard theory still remained.
3 A few experiments—especially earlier ones—used
small losses rather than zero payoffs.
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vidual strictly prefers one bet over the other, she
will reveal that preference both by placing a
higher money value on the preferred bet and by
choosing that bet when offered a straight choice
between the two. There are now dozens of stud-
ies, however, showing that a substantial propor-
tion of respondents (often the mode, sometimes
the majority) violate that expectation and in-
stead exhibit a “standard” reversal by choosing
the P-bet while placing a higher money value on
the $-bet. The opposite “nonstandard” rever-
sal—choosing the $-bet but placing a higher
money value on the P-bet—is much less fre-
quently observed.
4 The fact that standard rever-
sals usually outnumber nonstandard reversals so
heavily has led almost all observers to conclude
that this phenomenon cannot be accounted for
in terms of random noise, however speciﬁed.
Other types of reversal are possible. One of
these is the second form considered by M&S,
involving probability equivalents rather than
money equivalents. Taking the same two bets,
one task, as before, is to make a straight choice
between them. But now, instead of stating a
money value for each, respondents are asked to
consider a third “yardstick” lottery that offers
some given payoff x, but that leaves unspeciﬁed
the probability q of receiving that payoff. Re-
spondents are then required to set the level of q
so that they are indifferent between that lottery
and the P-bet; and then, separately, to set the
level of q again so that they are indifferent
between this yardstick lottery and the $-bet.
These values of q are the “probability equiva-
lents” of the two bets; and, again, the usual
assumption is that an individual will set a higher
q for whichever of the two bets she prefers, and
that this will correspond with the bet she picks
in a straight choice between the two.
There is much less evidence regarding the
relationship between choice and probability
equivalents for bets. Indeed, apart from Mac-
Crimmon and Smith’s own experiment, the only
substantial body of data about “probability
reversals” is the one reported in the paper
by Robin Cubitt, Alistair Munro, and Chris
Starmer (2004). What they found is that al-
though the total numbers of reversals (that is,
standard plus nonstandard) were roughly the
same for both money equivalents and proba-
bility equivalents, the distributions were
rather different: whereas the money equiva-
lents exhibited the usual marked asymmetry,
the probability equivalence method produced
approximately equal numbers of both kinds of
reversal, rather than any consistently asym-
metrical pattern in either direction. This is
broadly in line with what M&S had them-
selves found (although their sample size was
much smaller and their experiment involved
only one pair of bets).
Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer (2004) con-
cluded that none of the economic or psycholog-
ical theories they had set out to test could
explain the patterns they observed. They then
discussed other possible explanations, including
stochastic preference models, but could not
identify any variant of such a model that they
considered likely to be able to account for their
data. They did not, however, consider the ap-
proach that M&S thought might provide an ex-
planation for their own broadly similar results.
To explain the nub of the M&S approach,
while at the same time setting the scene for our
experiment, consider Figures 1A and 1B. In
both ﬁgures, the basic elements are identical:
the vertical dimension represents probability,
the horizontal dimension represents payoffs,
and $ and P depict the two bets we used in our
experiment—respectively, a 0.25 chance of 80
Australian dollars (A$) and a 0.70 chance of
A$24. For both bets, the “losing” payoff was
zero.
Figure 1A illustrates the way that M&S
viewed the certainty equivalence task. Essen-
tially, an individual has to identify a sum of
money to be received with certainty—that is, a
point on the north side of the rectangle—which
she regards as equally as good as the bet being
considered. In a conventional deterministic
model, there would be just one such point for a
given individual. But what if the individual does
not have such precise preferences? Starting with
the P-bet, all that we can be fairly sure about is
that transparent dominance will be respected, so
that the individual will be sure that the amount
must lie somewhere between 0 and A$24. Of
4 An exception to this was reported by Jeff Casey (1991),
who discovered a manipulation that produced a majority
of nonstandard reversals, which he interpreted as suggest-
ing that a contingent decision process, rather than a hard-wired
information processing limitation, underlay the phenomenon.
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particular individual might be able to narrow
their personal range down somewhat further:
perhaps she feels quite conﬁdent that she’d
rather have the P-bet than A$7 (or anything
less), and, on the other side, is quite conﬁdent
that if offered A$15 or more, she would always
take the sure sum.
There may, however, be some range—be-
tween A$7 and A$15 in this example—where
this individual ﬁnds it difﬁcult to be so conﬁ-
dent. Should it be A$8, A$10, A$12, or A$14?
This range of values, within which the person
ﬁnds it hard to be sure whether one is a better
reﬂection of their preferences than another, is
what M&S referred to as an imprecise equiva-
lence. To avoid possible confusion with “thick”
indifference curves,
5 we think the term “impre-
cision interval” might be more appropriate. By
this, we mean the range where an individual
ﬁnds it hard to say whether any particular value
is preferable to or less preferred than the stim-
ulus, and therefore the range where no one
value is obviously better or worse than another
5 See Richard Quandt (1956, 311–12) for the difﬁculties
associated with thick indifference curves.
FIGURE 1A. ILLUSTRATING IMPRECISION—CERTAINTY EQUIVALENCE
FIGURE 1B. ILLUSTRATING IMPRECISION—PROBABILITY EQUIVALENCE
280 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2007as an expression of equivalence for the stimulus
being evaluated.
6 For the individual in our ex-
ample, that interval is shown in Figure 1A as the
range on the north side of the rectangle encom-
passed by the two lines connected to the P-bet.
7
For any particular lottery, both the width and
the location of such an interval may vary from
one individual to another; and for some, the
interval may not exist at all—for example,
someone who has convinced himself that an
“expected value” (EV) rule is the right one to
use may be quite sure he would choose the
lottery rather than any sure sum less than its EV,
and be equally sure that he would choose any
sure sum that was bigger than the EV. But M&S
conjectured that, for many people, there would
be such an interval, and that the existence of
such intervals might help explain patterns of
observed response—such as preference rever-
sals—which appear to depart systematically
from the implications of standard theory.
M&S refrained from putting a great deal of
formal structure on these intervals, and they left
open the possibility that particular features of dif-
ferent elicitation procedures might inﬂuence their
width and location. Their main proposition was
that as a bet gets farther away from the north side
of the rectangle—that is, as the bet becomes more
dissimilar from a certainty—the interval is liable
to grow wider. Thus, we might expect the in-
terval for the typical $-bet to be wider. In the
case of the $-bet in Figure 1A, dominance
requires the interval to lie between 0 and
A$80, although a particular individual may be
able to identify, say, A$5 and A$30 as the
lower and upper bounds of her personal
interval.
Thus, Figure 1A depicts a hypothetical case
where the P-bet interval is entirely contained
within the $-bet interval,
8 but where the range
of values above the P-bet upper bound that
could be assigned to the $-bet is much broader
than the corresponding range of values below
the P-bet’s lower bound. Of course, the likeli-
hood that this individual will actually assign a
higher value to the $-bet than to the P-bet would
depend on some model of how particular values
are selected from within those intervals, and
M&S are agnostic on that question, simply
pointing to the considerable scope for picking a
higher value from the $-bet interval than from
the P-bet interval, particularly if the elicitation
procedure cues the respondent to pick a re-
sponse more toward the upper end of each of the
two intervals.
9
Having outlined the idea with respect to a
certainty equivalence task, consider now the
implications for the probability equivalence
task, as depicted in Figure 1B. For this task, a
particular payoff is identiﬁed—in our case,
A$160—and the respondent is asked to state
the probability of receiving A$160, which she
regards as equally as good as the bet under
consideration.
Again, transparent dominance sets some
bounds on the intervals: for the $-bet, the stated
probability must be less than 0.25, while for the
P-bet it must be less than 0.7. Figure 1B shows
the case of an individual who feels conﬁdent
that she would prefer the $-bet if the alternative
offered less than a 0.1 chance of A$160, and
feels conﬁdent that she would prefer the alter-
native if it offered more than a 0.2 chance of
A$160, but is unsure about her preference when
the chance of A$160 lies between 0.1 and 0.2.
For the more dissimilar P-bet, the imprecision
interval spans a broader range—from 0.05 to
0.35. As depicted in Figure 1B, the probability
equivalence task allows more scope for the P-
bet to be “valued” more highly than the $-bet.
We wanted to see whether actual behavior cor-
responded with this depiction. By using the
parameters shown in Figures 1A and 1B, our
experiment was designed to give plenty of room
for standard reversals to outnumber nonstand-
ard reversals in the certainty equivalence task,
6 A similar-sounding, but essentially different, notion of
“indecisiveness” has been formalized by Kﬁr Eliaz and Efe
Ok (2006). Their approach also offers an account of some
cases of the standard preference reversal phenomenon, but it
cannot accommodate much of the evidence we present in
this paper.
7 The lines are drawn straight purely for clarity.
8 This is not a requirement of the analysis: it just avoids
complicating the diagram.
9 For example, if the task is framed, as is the case in quite
a few preference reversal experiments, as an open-ended
question along the lines of—“What is the smallest sum you
would be willing to sell this bet for?”—the respondent may
be cued to “anchor” on the positive payoff and adjust
cautiously downward; or may adopt a strategic/bargaining
stance where the opening ask is on the high side. Either of
these ways of generating a response may increase the
chances of picking a value from the upper end of the
interval.
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scope for the opposite asymmetry in the prob-
ability equivalence task.
Neither the original experiment by M&S nor
the more recent experiment by Cubitt, Munro,
and Starmer gave their respondents this kind of
scope in the probability equivalence task. In
both of those cases, the payoff in the “refer-
ence” lottery was set somewhere between the
payoffs in the $-bets and the P-bets,
10 giving a
situation much more like the one shown in
Figure 1C (where the broken line signiﬁes a
reference payoff of A$50). On the basis of
Figures 1A and 1B, it seems quite plausible that
for many respondents the two intervals might
largely coincide, or at least—as in this exam-
ple—show no particular asymmetry between
the regions that do not coincide. Thus, it would
not be surprising to ﬁnd approximately equal
propensities for reversals in both directions—
which is more or less what both papers report.
In that sense, this model does seem to have
some potential for organizing the Cubitt,
Munro, and Starmer results. However, because
a reference payoff between the $-bet and P-bet
payoffs could in principle cause some responses
to be truncated,
11 and because the potentially
more dramatic contrast allowed by the Fig-
ure 1B design had not been investigated by the
other studies, we selected the parameters shown
in Figures 1A and 1B.
II. Design and Objectives of the Experiment
In the previous section, we set out the back-
ground and broad conceptual framework moti-
vating the experiment and indicated the basic
parameters to be used: a P-bet offering a 70-
percent chance of A$24; a $-bet offering a 25-
percent chance of A$80; and a reference lottery
with a payoff of A$160 (US$1  A$1.40 at
PPP). In this section, we describe our design in
more detail, and in particular the methods used
to elicit responses.
In order to focus upon the issue of impreci-
sion, we wished to control as far as possible for
other procedural effects and to make the elici-
tation of certainty equivalent and probability
equivalent values as similar to each other, and
to the elicitation of straight choice, as possible.
10 In M&S, the payoffs for the P-bet and the $-bet were,
respectively, $2.50 and $10.00, and the payoff in their
reference lottery was $5.00. In Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer,
the $-bet payoffs in the ﬁve nondominance pairs ranged
between £32 and £10, while the corresponding P-bet pay-
offs ranged from £8 to £4, with the reference lottery payoff
set at £10.
11 Consider, for example, one of the $-bets offered by
Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer: a 31-percent chance of £32.
The expected value of this bet is £9.92, so a risk-neutral
respondent would set the probability of the £10 reference
payoff at 0.99. There is thus nowhere for any risk-seeking
respondents to go, except to set the reference probability at
1.00, which for many such individuals would not really be
an equivalent, and they would, in effect, be forced to un-
derstate their value of the bet.
FIGURE 1C. IMPRECISION WITH INTERMEDIATE REFERENCE LOTTERY
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method.
Figure 2A shows an example of the computer
display used to elicit the money equivalent of
the P-bet. A respondent was asked to consider
option A (in this case, the P-bet) and option B (a
sure sum of money), with the payoffs shown in
the middle two rows and their respective prob-
abilities shown above (for A) and below (for B).
Half of the respondents were allocated at ran-
dom to a treatment where the ﬁrst sure payoff
they were presented with was A$1, while the
other half initially saw a value equal to the
positive payoff offered by option A (i.e., A$24
when option A was the P-bet, or A$80 when
option A was the $-bet).
Respondents were then asked to respond in
one of four ways,
12 which we recorded on a 1–4
scale: if they “deﬁnitely preferred” option A, we
coded it as 1; if they “probably preferred” A, a
2 was recorded; 3 signiﬁed “probably prefer-
ring” B; and a deﬁnite preference for B was
coded as 4.
For the example displayed, it was always the
case that a respondent initially signiﬁed either a
“deﬁnite” or “probable” preference for option A.
Once the response had been recorded, the com-
puter program changed the amount offered by
option B—either raising it by A$1 if the start-
ing point had been low, as in Figure 2A, or
reducing it by A$1 if the starting point had been
high—and the next response was requested, and
so on, for the full range of sure amounts.
13 We
shall refer to these treatments respectively as
“iterating up” (U) and “iterating down” (D).
The software did not permit subjects to make
glaring inconsistencies, such as recording a
lesser preference for an option when its attrac-
tiveness is increased. However, if they wished,
they could use the “back” button to undo their
earlier selections, before recording a new set of
choices.
Note that this incremental choice technique is
not a “valuation” method as commonly under-
stood in preference reversal experiments. All
preference elicitations via this procedure rely on
expressions of (strength of) choice preferences.
Thus, for each respondent we collected not only
12 The instructions are available on the AER Web site
(http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar07/20050175/_data.zip).
13 Mosteller and Nogee (1951, 374) described a some-
what related procedure for a wager offering an 80-percent
chance of losing 5c combined with a 20-percent chance of
winning x, where x is raised incrementally from 1c to $5.
They conjectured that “... as [x] increases from 1c towards
$5, vacillation sets in, the bet is taken occasionally, then
more and more often, until ﬁnally, the bet is taken nearly all
the time. There is not a sudden jump from no acceptances to
all acceptances at a particular offer.”
LOTTERIES
70% 30%
$24 $0
$1
B
100%
A
I definitely prefer 
lottery B
I think I prefer lottery B 
but I'm not sure
I think I prefer lottery A 
but I'm not sure
I definitely prefer 
lottery A
PREFERENCE
Accept
Change
FIGURE 2A. ELICITING CERTAINTY EQUIVALENT OF P-BET
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point) for each bet, but also some indication of
the interval (between 1 7 2 and 3 7 4) over
which they considered themselves to be less
than sure about their preference.
14 This is in
contrast to M&S, who did not attempt to mea-
sure imprecision in preferences.
Figure 2B gives an example of the display
used to elicit the probability equivalent, this
time for the $-bet. In this format, half of the
respondents were allocated at random to a treat-
ment where the B option offered A$160 with
the probability set at its minimum value of 0.01,
while the other half initially saw a display (as
illustrated in Figure 2B) with the B option of-
fering A$160 with the same probability as the A
option offered for its positive payoff. As with
the money equivalence task, respondents were
asked to respond to a succession of incremental
(0.01) changes to reveal the probability equiv-
alent (2 7 3) point, and any interval of uncer-
tainty around it.
Of course, once we allow the possibility that
individuals may be somewhat hazy or uncertain
about their preferences, it would be rather par-
adoxical to expect that they should be abso-
lutely sure about the exact points at which they
start and stop being uncertain. Moreover, given
the considerable literature about people’s sus-
ceptibility to all sorts of procedural effects, it
was conceivable that the incremental choice
procedure might induce some systematically
different patterns of response when compared
with a one-off straight choice procedure.
In particular, it seemed quite plausible that
the direction of iteration might have an effect—
hence the randomization of respondents be-
tween U and D in order to check for any such
effect. What we had in mind was this. In the U
treatment, where respondents are presented with
either the P-bet or the $-bet as option A, and an
option B starting at either a very low sure sum
or a very low probability of receiving the ref-
erence payoff, the great majority can be ex-
pected to start by stating a deﬁnite preference
for option A. This may then become their “ref-
erence” option, and the subsequent increases in
the values in option B may be seen as attempts
to persuade them to give up what they started
with. If, however, they are uncertain about the
precise point of parity between the two options,
they might be inclined to hold on to the per-
ceived status quo for a little longer, so that their
1 7 2 and 2 7 3 (and possibly 3 7 4) switch-
points are all raised somewhat.
The opposite effect might occur for those
randomized to the D treatment. Their starting
point is very likely to be a strong preference for
option B, with successive reductions in the
value of that option being seen as an attempt to
induce them to give it up. It is true that an option
that is continually changing may have less
“reference” status than one that stays constant
14 A respondent who felt no sense of uncertainty could
switch from 1 to 4 (or vice versa) without ever recording 2
or 3. In fact, 6 of our 89 respondents did this for both the
$-bet and the P-bet.
LOTTERIES 
  % 5 7   % 5 2
A
$80 $0
$160 $0 B
  % 5 7   % 5 2
Accept
PREFERENCE  
I definitely prefer 
lottery A 
I think I prefer lottery A but 
I'm not sure 
I think I prefer lottery B but 
I'm not sure 
I definitely prefer 
lottery B 
Change
FIGURE 2B. ELICITING PROBABILITY EQUIVALENT OF $-BET
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there is any inclination to stick with what has
initially been chosen, the effect would be to
lower the 3 7 4 and 2 7 3 (and possibly the 1 7
2) switch-points.
To examine that issue, we not only random-
ized respondents between U and D, but also
asked them to make pairwise choices between
each of the bets and various predetermined sure
amounts and chances of the reference payoff.
So we asked each respondent to make: ﬁve
one-off choices between the $-bet and ﬁve dif-
ferent sure amounts—8, 12, 16, 20, and 24
dollars; ﬁve one-off choices between the $-bet
and ﬁve different probabilities of receiving
A$160—0.10, 0.12, 0.15, 0.18, and 0.20; ﬁve
one-off choices between the P-bet and ﬁve dif-
ferent sure amounts—4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 dol-
lars; and ﬁve one-off choices between the P-bet
and ﬁve different probabilities of receiving
A$160—0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, and 0.30. In
addition, using the same basic display, we asked
respondents to make a straight choice between
the $-bet and the P-bet on three separate
occasions.
In order to try to keep each preference-
reversal-related decision somewhat separate,
we alternated them with questions similar in
format but using different parameters and de-
signed to investigate whether imprecision
might also account for violations of indepen-
dence and betweenness. Space does not permit a
comprehensive analysis and report of those
data,
15 but there is one aspect that is particularly
pertinent to the present paper, so a brief outline
of certain salient features is in order.
Figure 3 shows a Marschak-Machina triangle
diagram of the kind often used to explain de-
signs intended to test for independence and be-
tweenness. Any lottery involving no more than
three payoffs x3  x2  x1 can be depicted as a
point in the triangle, where the vertical axis
represents the probability of x3, the horizontal
axis represents the probability of x1, and the
probability of x2 is given by 1  pr(x1) 
pr(x3). Thus, in Figure 3, lottery M2 offers a 0.6
chance of x3 and a 0.4 chance of x1, while M5
offers a 0.2 chance of x3, a 0.6 chance of x2, and
a 0.2 chance of x1.
The questions that alternated with the prefer-
ence reversal tasks each involved taking one of
the lotteries M1–M5 as the ﬁxed option A in
Figure 2B and then eliciting a series of strength
of preference responses as option B moved pro-
gressively along the vertical and horizontal
edges of the triangle, either from a starting point
which strictly dominated the M lottery to a
ﬁnishing point which was strictly dominated by
the relevant M, or in the opposite direction, with
half of the sample being assigned to each direc-
tion of iteration. Within each of those treat-
ments, half were assigned to lotteries where
x3  A$60, x2  A$20, and x1  0, while for
the other half the payoffs were A$40, A$20, and
0 respectively.
Thus, for example, in the question where the
ﬁxed lottery was M2, a respondent who was
assigned to the subsample that iterated up (from
dominated to dominating) with lotteries where
x3  A$60 would start with option A displaying
a 0.6 chance of A$60 and a 0.4 chance of 0 with
lottery B offering a 0.6 chance of A$20 and a
0.4 chance of 0—this latter being the point on
the horizontal axis of Figure 3 directly below
M2. Lottery B would then be progressively im-
proved, ﬁrst by increasing the probability of
A$20 and correspondingly decreasing the prob-
ability of zero—that is, moving steadily left-
ward along the horizontal until reaching the
corner where B offered the certainty of A$20—
and then by increasing the probability of A$60
and correspondingly decreasing the probability
15 A more comprehensive report can be found on the
AER Web site.
FIGURE 3. MARSCHAK-MACHINA TRIANGLE
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tical edge, ﬁnishing at the point level with M2
where lottery B now dominates M2 by offering
a 0.6 chance of A$60 and a 0.4 chance of A$20.
As with the preference reversal questions,
this iterative procedure was intended to identify
not only the 2 7 3 switch-point for each M but
also the interval between 1 7 2 and 3 7 4
which we are taking to be an indication of
imprecision. It is these latter measures that are
pertinent to the present paper, since they pro-
vide additional information relating to the M&S
conjecture that these intervals get wider as the
ﬁxed lottery gets farther from the edge where its
equivalence is being judged. In terms of the
Marschak-Machina triangle, M2 and M3 will
generally be more dissimilar
16 from their coun-
terparts on the horizontal or vertical edges than
will be the case for M1,M 4, and M5. But will
the imprecision intervals reﬂect this? In addi-
tion, we might expect that, all other things being
equal, broader ranges of payoffs will increase
uncertainty about where the equivalences lie: so
will the intervals be wider for the lotteries
where the range is A$60 than for those where
the range is A$40?
Just as with the preference reversal questions,
there were also a number of one-off straight-
choice questions based on the Marschak-
Machina triangle; and as with the preference
reversal questions, these were intended to pro-
vide a basis for examining how far the direction
of iteration might affect the patterns of choices.
We could ﬁnd no way of making the distinc-
tion between “deﬁnitely preferring” an option
and “probably preferring” that same option in-
centive compatible. We doubt that such a mech-
anism can be devised—at least, not in a form
simple and transparent enough to work without
creating additional uncertainty. So we relied
upon respondents making the distinction simply
because we asked them to do so and because
they found that distinction meaningful. In Sec-
tion IV we shall consider arguments for and
against taking these data seriously.
However, we were able to make their straight
choices between A and B incentive compatible,
and it was explained that all these choices were
made on the basis that, at the end of the session,
one question would be selected at random for
each respondent, who would each be paid ac-
cording to the way their decision in that partic-
ular question worked out. Average earnings
across the sample were A$26, ranging from a
low of A$0 to a high of A$160.
Thus, by the end of the experiment we had
obtained from each respondent the following
data relating to preference reversal: point esti-
mates of certainty equivalents for the $-bet and
P-bet (denoted by CE$ and CEP), together with
an indication of the interval of imprecision
around those points; corresponding probability
equivalent estimates (PE$ and PEP) and inter-
vals; three straight choices between the two
bets; and a total of 20 straight choices between
the bets and various prespeciﬁed sure sums or
preset chances of receiving A$160. We had
also obtained additional relevant data from the
Marschak-Machina component of the design.
III. Results
A total of 89 individuals took part in the
experiment, 44 allocated at random to D, 45 to
U. The ﬁrst issue is whether the patterns of
response were systematically affected by the
direction of iteration in the manner hypothe-
sized above.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of re-
sponses to the four incremental tasks, in each
case showing the means and standard errors of
the 1 7 2, 2 7 3, and 3 7 4 switch-points. It
is clear that in three tasks out of four, the
direction of iteration made a signiﬁcant differ-
ence to all switch-points in the hypothesized
direction, while in the other task—the certainty
equivalent of the $-bet—the difference is in that
same direction, although not to an extent which
registers as signiﬁcant.
Of course, even though respondents were al-
located to D and U at random, it is just possible
that those in the D subsample happened to have
lower values for the $- and P-bets than their
U subsample counterparts. To examine this,
16 Ariel Rubinstein (1988) discusses how different de-
grees of similarity between lotteries within the triangle
framework might account for particular violations of inde-
pendence. David Buschena and David Zilberman (2000)
considered whether the degree of similarity, as reﬂected by
distances between lotteries in the triangle, might be a factor
affecting the variance of the “errors” people might make in
decision experiments.
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choices. The ﬁrst column shows whether option
A was the $- or P-bet while the second column
shows the various sure amounts or chances of
A$160 offered by option B. The next two col-
umns show, respectively, the numbers in the D
subsample and the numbers in the U subsample
who actually chose option A rather than what-
ever option B was offering. In general, the num-
bers are very similar, and only one comparison
(for the $-bet when option B offers the certainty
of A$8) exhibits a difference that is signiﬁcant
at the 5-percent level—but since that is just one
of the 20 comparisons, it could have occurred
by chance.
The ﬁfth and sixth columns in Table 2 show
for D and U, respectively, the numbers inferred
from their iterative responses to prefer option A
rather than whatever option B was offering. In
keeping with expectations and with the data
from Table 1, inferred choices of A are higher
for the U subsample than the D subsample in 19
out of 20 cases, and in many cases the differ-
ences are pronounced.
We can also examine any patterns of differ-
ences between responses to the iterative ques-
tions (which were not incentive-linked) and
responses to the straight choice questions
(which were linked to incentives in the conven-
tional manner).
In the case of the U subsample, these differ-
ences are systematic and marked: here, too, the
direction of difference goes the same way in 19
out of 20 cases, with the numbers inferred as
preferring option A being strictly higher than
the numbers actually picking option A in the
corresponding straight choice. The eighth col-
umn of Table 2 reports signiﬁcance levels for
these differences, and in the majority of cases
they are signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
TABLE 1—MEAN SWITCH-POINT VALUES
Switch-point
Subsample
z-stat Signiﬁcance D( N 44) U (N  45)
CEP Dollars
1 7 2 mean 8.00 13.73 5.45 0.000
s.e. 0.61 0.85
2 7 3 mean 11.16 16.78 5.97 0.000
s.e. 0.59 0.73
3 7 4 mean 13.98 19.42 5.60 0.000
s.e. 0.65 0.73
CE$ Dollars
1 7 2 mean 13.30 14.96 0.67 0.506
s.e. 1.35 2.07
2 7 3 mean 20.57 23.00 0.99 0.323
s.e. 1.41 1.99
3 7 4 mean 32.11 35.02 0.91 0.366
s.e. 2.16 2.36
PEP Percent chance of A$160
1 7 2 mean 15.64 29.38 4.31 0.000
s.e. 2.10 2.40
2 7 3 mean 26.05 38.62 3.83 0.000
s.e. 2.22 2.41
3 7 4 mean 35.14 50.89 4.29 0.000
s.e. 2.51 2.68
PE$ Percent chance of A$160
1 7 2 mean 8.39 14.40 5.41 0.000
s.e. 0.71 0.85
2 7 3 mean 12.57 18.33 5.87 0.000
s.e. 0.65 0.73
3 7 4 mean 15.61 20.93 5.53 0.000
s.e. 0.66 0.70
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of differences (11/20) are in the opposite direc-
tion, and the pattern is much more mixed. For
the certainty equivalence of the P-bet and the
probability equivalence of the $-bet, inferred
choices of option A undershoot the actual
choices for the three highest values of option B,
but the differences fade thereafter. In the case of
the probability equivalence of the P-bet, there is
not much to choose between actual and inferred.
And for the certainty equivalence of the $-bet,
inferred choices of the $-bet exceed actual
choices at every level, although this effect is
weaker for the D subsample than for the U
subsample.
The divergence between the responses elic-
ited via the Up (U) treatment and those from
both the Down (D) treatment and the straight
choices is entirely compatible with the notion
that many respondents are to some extent un-
sure about their preferences and therefore vul-
nerable to certain procedural effects: in
particular, a reluctance to switch away from an
unchanging “reference” option. However, the
design aimed to control for this, since respon-
dents either iterated up for all four preference
reversal equivalence tasks, or iterated down for
all four.
We turn next to the issue of the size of
intervals. Recall that although M&S made no
strong assumptions about the nature/extent of
imprecision, their hypothesis was that the inter-
vals tended to become wider, the more dissim-
ilar is the ﬁxed lottery from the edge on which
the equivalence is being expressed. Our proxy
measure for these intervals is the range between
the 1 7 2 and the 3 7 4 points.
For each respondent and for each of the four
tasks, we computed these intervals, denoting
them as follows: CEPint and CE$int are, respec-
tively, those intervals for the certainty equiva-
lence for the P-bet and $-bet; and PEPint and
PE$int are the corresponding measures for the
probability equivalence tasks. Figures 4A and
4B depict the average intervals for each sub-
sample. The points representing the P-bet and
TABLE 2—CHOICES OF P-BET AND $-BET AGAINST VARIOUS FIXED ALTERNATIVES
Option A Option B
Actual choices
of A
Inferred
choices of A
Actual versus inferred
signiﬁcance*
P-bet A$ for sure DUDU D U
4 38 44 41 44 0.375 1
8 34 32 34 44 1 0.000
12 29 21 20 36 0.035 0.001
16 11 12 3 25 0.039 0.002
2 0 2308n / a0.227
$-bet A$ for sure DUDU D U
8 34 24 40 42 0.070 0.000
12 27 21 33 36 0.146 0.001
16 15 11 28 32 0.004 0.000
20 6 4 26 24 0.000 0.000
24 10 4 16 21 0.210 0.000
P-bet Probability of A$160 DUDU D U
0.10 38 37 36 43 0.687 0.070
0.15 33 37 32 41 1 0.289
0.20 22 29 28 37 0.180 0.021
0.25 23 26 21 35 0.791 0.049
0.30 22 23 15 29 0.118 0.210
$-bet Probability of A$160 DUDU D U
0.10 31 35 33 42 0.804 0.065
0.12 33 33 27 39 0.210 0.109
0.15 21 22 10 34 0.001 0.017
0.18 12 14 3 25 0.022 0.019
0.20 5 7 2 12 0.453 0.267
* McNemar exact binomial test, 2-sided signiﬁcance level.
288 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2007$-bet are joined (for ease and simplicity) by
straight lines to the means of the 1 7 2 and 3 7
4 responses.
Although the position of these lines is af-
fected by the direction of iteration—the greater
degree of kink around each bet for the U sub-
sample being consistent with a stronger refer-
ence point effect—the width of the intervals
is fairly constant across subsamples: tests for
the difference between the D and U mean in-
tervals—reported in the upper part of Ta-
ble 3—show no signiﬁcant difference for any of
the four tasks.
To examine the issue at the level of individ-
uals, we computed for each respondent two
measures of the differences between their inter-
vals: for the certainty equivalence task we com-
puted CEintdiff  CE$int  CEPint, and for
the probability equivalence task, PEintdiff 
PE$int  PEPint. We then tested the null hy-
potheses that CEintdiff  0 and PEintdiff  0
against the alternative hypotheses that CEintdiff
is positive and PEintdiff is negative. As Ta-
ble 3 reports, for both cases and both sub-
samples, the null hypotheses were clearly rejected
in favor of the alternatives. The breakdown at the
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FIGURE 4B. AVERAGE INTERVALS FOR UP SUBSAMPLE
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89 individuals had CE$int  CEPint, with 10
having the same interval and 6 having the op-
posite inequality; at the same time, 71 of the 89
individuals had PE$int  PEPint, with 12 hav-
ing the same interval and 6 having the opposite
inequality. In both cases, if the null hypothesis
were true, the likelihood of such asymmetry
occurring by chance is vanishingly small.
17
These data could be interpreted as supporting
M&S’s conjecture that interval widths might be
an increasing function of the distance between
the position of the bet in the Figure 1 rectangle
and the side of that rectangle upon which the
response is recorded. For example, the $-bet is
roughly 2.5 times farther away from the top side
of the rectangle than the P-bet, and the average
CE$ intervals are 3.15 and 3.53 times bigger
than the average CEP intervals for the D and U
subsamples, respectively. Similarly, the P-bet is
about 1.7 times farther from the right-hand side
of the rectangle than the $-bet, and the ratios of
PEPint:PE$int are 2.70 and 3.29 for D and U.
There is, however, another possibility that ﬁts
the data at least as well, and is no less consistent
with the spirit of the model: namely, that the
width of each interval is positively correlated
with the ranges within which dominance is
not transgressed. For example, the CE of the
P-bet could lie anywhere between A$24 and 0
without violating dominance, while the allow-
able range for the CE of the $-bet (A$80 to 0) is
3.33 times bigger—a ﬁgure that neatly bisects
the CE$int:CEPint ratios of 3.15 and 3.53. Sim-
ilarly, the PE of the P-bet could lie between 0.70
and 0, while the allowable range for the $-bet is
between 0.25 and 0: the 2.8:1 ratio of these two
ranges also lies squarely between the observed
PEPint:PE$int ratios of 2.70 and 3.29.
The data from the lotteries in the Marschak-
Machina triangle, reported in Table 4, provide
further support for this possibility. Although the
distances between lotteries M1 to M4 and their
equivalents on the vertical/horizontal edges
vary a good deal, the imprecision intervals
within each triangle are strikingly similar, argu-
ably reﬂecting the fact that the allowable range
for each of M1 to M4 is the same—that is, 100
percentage points along the vertical/horizontal
17 Despite the similarity of the two breakdowns in ag-
gregate, it was not the same individuals who constituted the
six observations of opposite differences: there was only one
respondent for whom CE$int  CEPint and PEPint 
PE$int.
TABLE 4—IMPRECISION INTERVALS FOR ML OTTERIES
Lottery x3  $40 x3  $60
M1 21.16 25.82
M2 21.69 25.27
M3 21.11 27.23
M4 23.33 27.45
M5 9.29 11.44
(M5 Percent) (23.22) (28.57)
TABLE 3—IMPRECISION INTERVALS FOR P- AND $-BETS
DU z-stat Signiﬁcance
CEPint mean 5.98 5.69 0.33 0.74
s.e. 0.59 0.63
CE$int mean 18.82 20.07 0.40 0.69
s.e. 2.06 2.32
PEPint mean 19.50 21.51 0.69 0.49
s.e. 2.11 2.02
PE$int mean 7.23 6.53 0.67 0.51
s.e. 0.75 0.72
CEintdiff mean 12.84 7.20 0.00
s.e. 1.78
mean 14.38 6.08 0.00
s.e. 2.36
PEintdiff mean 12.27 6.54 0.00
s.e. 1.88
mean 14.98 8.37 0.00
s.e. 1.79
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18 For M5, which might be regarded as
more like M1 and/or M4 in terms of distance
from its edge equivalent, the imprecision inter-
val is narrower in absolute terms; but as the
ﬁgures in brackets in the bottom row of Ta-
ble 4 show, that interval represents much the
same proportion of the smaller allowable range
as we observe for M1 to M4 in the same triangle.
In addition, there does appear to be some effect
of payoff range: as tentatively conjectured, the
imprecision intervals are all higher for the lot-
teries where payoffs span A$60 as compared
with the corresponding lotteries in the A$40
triangle (although no single difference regis-
tered as statistically signiﬁcant).
Thus, there might be grounds for modifying
the M&S conjecture about the width of the
imprecision interval: it may not simply be a
function of the degree of (dis)similarity between
the ﬁxed lottery and the locus on which the
equivalence is being expressed, but may also be
inﬂuenced by the width of the range of possible
answers on that locus which are not disallowed
by dominance.
Of course, it is not just the widths of these
intervals but their location relative to one an-
other that is crucial to accounting for preference
reversals. As Figures 4A and 4B show, on av-
erage the CE$ intervals range over higher
money values than the CEP intervals: in fact,
for each subsample, the two intervals only
barely intersect. The PE intervals show a mirror
image of this pattern, with the PEP interval
involving much higher probabilities than the
PE$ interval (and not intersecting at all in the
case of subsample U). Such a pattern is even
more extreme than those envisaged in Fig-
ures 1A and 1B, and clearly has the potential to
accommodate both the standard preference re-
versal phenomenon involving certainty equiva-
lents and the opposite asymmetry involving
probability equivalents, as M&S conjectured.
The patterns were as follows. Recall that we
asked respondents to make straight choices be-
tween the P-bet and the $-bet on three separate
occasions. Of the 89 respondents, 51 chose the
P-bet on all three occasions, 17 chose the P-bet
twice and the $-bet once, 6 chose the P-bet once
and the $-bet twice, and 15 chose the $-bet on
all three occasions. In Tables 5 and 6, we report
the relationships between choices and equiva-
lences for each occasion of choice and each type
of equivalence.
Table 5 shows a pattern to which we have
become accustomed: setting aside those who
stated CEP  CE$ (and who would therefore be
weakly consistent whichever bet they chose),
between 32 and 36 respondents gave strictly
consistent answers to both tasks, while between
43 and 47 (that is, between 48.3 percent
and 52.8 percent of the sample) reversed their
stated preferences, with the least asymmetric
split relating to choice 1, where the ratio of
standard:nonstandard reversals was 42:1. The
usual null hypothesis—that both types of rever-
sal are equally likely to occur—is emphatically
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis
consistent with imprecise preferences. In case it
might be thought that the phenomenon relies
heavily on those who are least consistent in their
18 For example, for M2 the lowest 60 percent of the
vertical axis is in the allowable range, as is the leftmost 40
percent of the horizontal axis; for M5, the allowable range
consists of the lowest 20 percent of the vertical edge and the
leftmost 20 percent of the horizontal edge.
TABLE 5—CHOICES COMPARED WITH CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS
CEP  CE$ CEP  CE$ CEP  CE$
Choice #1 Chose P 10 9 42
Chose $ 1 1 26
Choice #2 Chose P 11 10 47
Chose $ 0 0 21
Choice #3 Chose P 10 9 45
Chose $ 1 1 23
Consistent choice in #1, #2, and #3 Chose P 10 8 33
Chose $ 0 0 15
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exclusively on those who made the same choice
on all three occasions. Exactly half of these 66
exhibited reversals, all of which were in the
standard direction.
Table 6 displays the corresponding data for
the probability equivalence task. Here, as pre-
dicted by the model of imprecision, reversals
displayed the opposite asymmetry; and even in
the least asymmetrical instance, relating to
choice 2, the probability of the 14:6 split occur-
ring by chance if the null hypothesis were true
is 0.058 (exact binomial test), while for the
more asymmetric instances relating to choices 1
and 3, the corresponding probabilities are 0.002
and 0.006. Once again, to check whether this
pattern was largely attributable to those who
were least consistent in their choices, the lowest
panel of Table 6 reports the data for the 66 who
made the same choice on all three occasions. Of
the 15 who consistently chose the $-bet, 9 gave
a strictly higher probability equivalent to the
P-bet, while only 2 of the 51 who consistently
chose the P-bet exhibited the opposite reversal:
the likelihood of that 9:2 split occurring by
chance is 0.033.
The patterns of imprecision depicted in Fig-
ures 4A and 4B not only are consistent with all
of the above, but also help us to make sense of
another aspect of the preference reversal phe-
nomenon which has not been well explained by
earlier theories: namely, what Peter Fishburn
(1988) called “strong reversals.” In the context
of certainty equivalents, a strong reversal is said
to occur when the P-bet is chosen even though
the certainty equivalent of the $-bet is strictly
greater than the positive payoff offered by the
P-bet. (Fishburn referred to cases where CE$ is
less than the positive payoff of the P bet as
“weak” reversals.) It turns out that even models
such as regret theory (David Bell 1982; Loomes
and Sugden 1982, 1987) and SSB utility the-
ory (Fishburn 1982), which can accommodate
weak preference reversals by relaxing transi-
tivity, cannot accommodate strong reversals.
And although Fishburn did not address the
question of reversals in probability, it also
turns out that strong reversals of this kind—
where the $-bet is chosen even though the
probability equivalent of the P-bet is strictly
greater than the chance offered by the $-bet of
receiving its positive payoff—are not compat-
ible with regret or SSB theories in their de-
terministic forms.
19
However, preference imprecision allows for
the possibility of strong reversals of both kinds.
Almost half of the width of subsample D’s CE$
interval, and slightly more than half of sub-
sample U’s CE$ interval, occupy values that are
strictly higher than the A$24 payoff. At the
same time, more than half of subsample D’s
PEP interval, and all of subsample U’s PEP
interval, involve probabilities that are strictly
higher than the $-bet’s 0.25 probability. Of
course, those intervals are based on averages
and do not represent every respondent. Never-
theless, it turned out that 40.3 percent of the
19 In fact, the restrictions on regret theory’s ( , ) func-
tion that allow the classic pattern of CE reversals also entail
reversals in that same direction when probability equiva-
lences are elicited—that is, regret theory is incompatible not
only with strong probability reversals but also with weak PE
reversals of the kind that predominate here.
TABLE 6—CHOICES COMPARED WITH PROBABILITY EQUIVALENTS
PEP  PE$ PEP  PE$ PEP  PE$
Choice #1 Chose P 57 0 4
Chose $ 18 1 9
Choice #2 Chose P 61 1 6
Chose $ 14 0 7
Choice #3 Chose P 59 1 4
Chose $ 16 0 9
Consistent choice in #1, #2, and #3 Chose P 49 0 2
Chose $ 9 0 6
292 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2007standard money reversals were strong reversals,
while a similar proportion—43.8 percent—of
the relevant probability reversals were also
strong ones.
IV. Discussion
We set out to explore the degree of impre-
cision as indicated by people’s statements of
their preferences, taking as a general frame-
work a model along the lines sketched out by
M&S. We devised an instrument that not only
elicited the points at which respondents
switched from one option to another, but also
attempted to get some measure of the inter-
vals around those points where respondents
were less than sure about their preferences.
We conducted what we believe to be the ﬁrst
test of the implications of the M&S approach
for PE reversals when the yardstick lottery
offers a payoff higher than the payoffs of
either bet, as well as replicating the usual CE
reversal phenomenon. It appears that the
model of imprecision discussed in this paper
not only accounts for our data, but also orga-
nizes the data that M&S (1986) and Cubitt,
Munro, and Starmer (2004) reported, and pro-
vides a framework that can accommodate the
“strong” CE reversals observed in many stud-
ies and remarked upon by Fishburn (1988), as
well as strong PE reversals never previously
reported but found in our data.
These data suggest that in the absence of
very precise “true” preferences, respondents
faced with equivalence tasks may be liable to
pick one value from an imprecision interval,
with their perception of the range of this
interval, and their selection of a particular
value from within it, both liable to be inﬂu-
enced by various “cues” or “anchors.” In our
data, it appears that one anchor was the start-
ing point in the iterative procedure, with the
difference between the D and U treatments,
as reported in Table 1 and displayed in Fig-
ures 4A and 4B, suggesting that this had a
discernible inﬂuence both upon the location
of the interval and the switch-points within it.
In addition, there was evidence suggesting
that the width of the imprecision interval was
liable to be inﬂuenced by the width of the range
of possible responses that did not violate trans-
parent dominance. The implication is that im-
precision not only allows starting point effects
to inﬂuence people’s responses, but also makes
them susceptible to range effects sufﬁcient to
accommodate a number of strong reversals as
well as a great many weak ones.
20
Someone skeptical of our interpretation
might question the status of responses to pro-
cedures not directly linked to ﬁnancial incen-
tives. It might be suggested that respondents
really have fairly precise preferences which
they reveal with reasonable accuracy when
offered the appropriate ﬁnancial incentives,
but that in the absence of such incentives they
have no motivation to engage properly with
the tasks and answer carefully. So is it safe to
rely on data from the iterative procedures to
inform us about behavior when the stakes are
real?
A comprehensive discussion of the general
importance (or otherwise) of ﬁnancial (or other)
incentives in decision experiments is beyond
the scope of this paper, so we address our re-
marks to the speciﬁc question of the usefulness
of our imprecision data for understanding the
preference reversal phenomena that are the sub-
ject of this paper. We suggest that this issue
might be judged on the basis of two criteria:
ﬁrst, whether the data show reasonable signs of
being the product of engagement and delibera-
tion, as opposed to being generated haphaz-
ardly, with little thought or effort; and second,
20 Starting point effects and range effects have been
widely reported in the psychology literature and in a number
of studies seeking to elicit values for health, safety, or
environmental goods—again, see Bateman et al. (2002) for
a review. One striking example of both effects in operation
can be found in Richard Dubourg, Michael Jones-Lee, and
Loomes (1997), where values were elicited for reductions in
the risks of road accident injuries. Respondents were asked
ﬁrst to identify amounts they were sure about—on the one
hand, amounts they were sure they would pay, and on the
other hand, larger amounts they were sure they would not
pay. There was often some interval in between where they
felt unsure, but they were asked to identify a single value in
that interval as their “best estimate” of their maximum
willingness to pay. As in our experiment, both the position
of the intervals and the distributions of best estimates were
inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by the starting point in an iterative
bidding procedure and also by the range of values presented
on a payment card.
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tent with patterns in the incentive-linked
responses.
Regarding the ﬁrst question, the great major-
ity of our respondents expressed deﬁnite pref-
erences over some ranges and more tentative
preferences over other ranges on either side of
the point where they switched from one option
to the other, and did so in ways that showed
considerable and systematic responsiveness to
the characteristics of the different questions.
Respondents were clearly not changing from
“deﬁnite” to “probable” preference, or vice
versa, after much the same number of steps in
the iterative procedure, irrespective of the na-
ture of the lottery: for example, the 1 7 2
switch-point for the certainty equivalent of the
$-bet was typically between 15 percent and 20
percent of the distance from the bottom of the
iterative range, while the 3 7 4 switch-point
was just over 40 percent of the way along (i.e.,
less than halfway); by contrast, the 1 7 2
switch-point for the certainty equivalent of the
P-bet was typically between a third and a half
way along the range, with the 3 7 4 switch-
point lying roughly 60 percent to 80 percent of
the way along (depending on the direction of
iteration). Given the different probabilities of
winning offered by the two bets in conjunction
with the kind of risk aversion typically exhib-
ited in decision experiments, this seems entirely
consistent with the proposition that respondents
were attending to the parameters of the lotteries
and trying to reﬂect their feelings about them.
Moreover, most respondents varied the widths
of their imprecision intervals quite substantially
from one question to another: as noted in the
text, more than 80 percent of respondents gave
wider intervals in the expected direction, even
though each interval was elicited in a question
separated from its counterpart by at least one
other question (taken from the Machina triangle
set) involving iteration in the opposite direction;
and as reported in Table 3, the wider intervals
were typically at least three times wider. All this
suggests that most participants had at least some
intuitive feel for the distinction between deﬁnite
and probable preference and, having been asked
to do so, reported those feelings as best they
could and in a manner that was broadly respon-
sive to the varying parameters of the lotteries
presented to them.
Nevertheless, a skeptic might still be trou-
bled by any systematic divergence between
hypothetical and incentive-linked data: in par-
ticular, the clear disparity between the actual
and inferred choices of the U subsample re-
ported in Table 2 might be a source of
concern.
On that speciﬁc issue, we anticipated that this
particular direction of iteration might encourage
a reference effect, and it seems that it did. But
that is not something peculiar to hypothetical
questions: such effects have been reported in
many studies using real—and sometimes quite
substantial—incentives, and they are often quite
resistant to attempts to counteract them. Having
anticipated this possibility, however, we con-
trolled for it with respect to the main focus of
the study (by using the same iteration direction
for the set of preference reversal questions), so
the patterns of reversals are not attributable to
this effect.
On a more general point, it appears that even
among the responses that were linked to incen-
tives in a standard way, there were disparities.
To see this, consider the “demand” for the $-bet
and the P-bet inferred from the choices where
four different sure sums—A$8, A$12, A$16,
and A$20—were offered as alternatives to both
bets. The total number of respondents choosing
the $-bet at those “price” levels were 58, 48, 26,
and 10, while the corresponding ﬁgures for the
P-bet were 66, 50, 23, and 5. On this basis, there
would appear to be little difference between the
demands for each bet.
By contrast, if we use the choices between
each of the bets and the three levels of yardstick
lottery against which they are both compared—
that is, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20 probabilities of
receiving A$160—the patterns of demand are
very different: against those three levels, the
P-bet was chosen, respectively, by 75, 70, and
51 respondents, whereas the corresponding ﬁg-
ures for the $-bet were 66, 43, and 12.
So the different sets of choice problems pro-
duced systematically different pictures of pref-
erence, even though the incentive mechanism
was exactly the same for both. With respon-
dents’ preferences displaying the kind of impre-
cision reported in this paper, it may be that all
methods of eliciting those preferences, with or
without incentives, are vulnerable to procedural
effects of one kind or another. The claim that
294 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2007incentives produce “truth” and/or that any one
procedure represents the gold standard—either
in the laboratory or in the ﬁeld—may need to be
treated with caution.
21
Having said all that, the key question for the
present study is whether the most striking fea-
ture of the data from the iterative procedure—
namely that the asymmetry found with certainty
equivalents is reversed when probability equiv-
alents are elicited—is also evident in the incen-
tive-linked choice data. The short answer is:
yes, it is.
Of course, asking pairwise choices involving
preset parameters is inevitably a more coarse-
grained procedure and is liable to miss cases.
For example, suppose an individual prefers P to
$ in a straight choice and would place certainty
equivalents of $15 on the $-bet and $13 on the
P-bet. Eliciting those equivalences would reveal
a preference reversal. However, if that same
individual is asked simply to choose between
each bet and a couple of preset certainties—say
$12 and $16—the reversal may be missed: she
prefers $16 for sure to each bet, and prefers
each bet to $12, and no reversal is observed
because the “action” lies between the two sure
amounts selected by the experimenter.
Nevertheless, if the phenomena revealed by
the iterative procedures have their counterparts
in straight choices, we should expect there to be
at least some indications. Denoting a sure
amount in a straight choice by C, the choice
analogue of a standard preference reversal is the
intransitive cycle P  $, $  C, C  P, with the
nonstandard reversal translating to $  P, P 
C, C  $. If the certainty equivalent asymmetry
reported in Table 5 also manifests itself in
straight choices, we should expect cycles of the
ﬁrst type to outnumber the second type. And,
indeed, taking the choices where C was set at
$8, $12, $16, and $20, there were a total of 69
cases of the “standard” cycle as compared with
19 cases of the “nonstandard” cycle. Of course,
given that each individual made numerous
choices, it was possible for the same individual
to record more than one version of the same
type of cycle. Taking the individual as the unit
of analysis, there were 22 respondents who ex-
hibited the standard cycle on at least one occa-
sion and never exhibited the nonstandard cycle,
as opposed to just 8 who exhibited the non-
standard cycle on at least one occasion. Using
the analogue of the null hypothesis applied ear-
lier—namely that individuals exhibit cycles as a
result of random error and are equally likely to
exhibit either form—the probability of this
asymmetry occurring by chance is 0.008.
Correspondingly, let Q represent the preset
lottery offering $160, with the probability tak-
ing one of the values 0.10, 0.15, or 0.20 against
which both bets were compared in straight
choices. Here the choice analogue of the rever-
sal most often observed in Table 6 is $  P, P 
Q, Q  $, while the less frequent form translates
to P  $, $  Q, Q  P. The choice data show
a total of 44 of the ﬁrst type and 17 of the
second type, with 18 individuals exhibiting only
the ﬁrst type, 6 exhibiting only the second type,
and 2 individuals each exhibiting 2 of the ﬁrst
type and 1 of the second type. Again, the null
hypothesis is rejected, either with probability
0.038 if the two “mixed” individuals are in-
cluded on the side of their more frequent cycles,
or with probability 0.011 if those individuals are
omitted. A more general null hypothesis, which
does not suppose that both types of cycle are
equally likely to be manifested, but only that
there should be no difference between the asym-
metries whether preferences are elicited via
choices involving C or via choices involving Q,
is also very ﬁrmly rejected (
2  10.15, p 
0.001).
So although the choice data are necessarily
coarser, and although there may be more noise
due to the presentation in quick succession of a
number of rather different pairs, the mirror-
image asymmetries revealed by the iterative
procedures are also manifested to a less visible,
but still signiﬁcant, extent in the choice data.
Our conclusion, then, is as follows. We con-
21 For applied work in the ﬁeld of environmental valua-
tion, a choice-based approach has been strongly advocated
(see Kenneth Arrow et al. 1993). In particular, it has been
suggested that the “gold standard” method involves asking
each member of a representative sample of the population a
single dichotomous choice question of the form—“Would
you pay $X for this beneﬁt?”—with respondents assigned at
random to different values of X. The idea is that, on the
basis of the overall pattern of responses, a demand function
for the beneﬁt can be estimated, from which the relevant
willingness to pay measure can be inferred. The differences
between the “demand schedules” inferred from the different
choice questions in our experiment at least raise questions
about the number of carats we should assign to that sup-
posed gold standard.
295 VOL. 97 NO. 1 BUTLER AND LOOMES: IMPRECISION AS AN ACCOUNT OF PREFERENCE REVERSALsider there are grounds for supposing that many
respondents’ preferences are to some degree
imprecise, and that such imprecision may be a
factor in explaining the occurrence of pre-
ference reversals and in accounting for the op-
posite asymmetric patterns predicted by Mac-
Crimmon and Smith (1986) and reported here.
We do not suggest that our iterative instrument
is immune from procedural effects, nor do we
claim that it does more than give some proxy
measure of the degree of imprecision. But it
does appear to produce relevant additional in-
formation about behavior in decision experi-
ments and about the role that imprecision may
play in systematic departures from standard
models of deterministic preferences. The impli-
cation is that no decision theory is likely to be
descriptively adequate unless it makes appropri-
ate allowance for the imprecision in people’s
expressed preferences; and that further explora-
tion of the nature of imprecision—whether by
means of the kind of instrument we have used,
or by other methods—may prove a fruitful line
of future inquiry.
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